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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this diversity case arising under Pennsylvania law, 
defendant Mitchell Corporation of Owosso ("Owosso") 
appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict based on a 
guaranty for payment of goods furnished to its subsidiary. 
Owosso argues that the guaranty was abrogated when the 
subsidiary was sold to another corporation. We will affirm. 
 
Owosso has been involved in the production of interior 
automotive trim for many years. In 1996, the company 
created a subsidiary called "Mitchell Manufacturing Group, 
Inc.," whose function was to process leather for use by auto 
manufacturers. Owosso's goal was ultimately to sell this 
subsidiary. 
 
Since its inception, the subsidiary had obtained leather 
from plaintiff Garden State Tanning, Inc. By 1997, Mitchell 
Manufacturing's account had become so delinquent that 
Garden State demanded Owosso's guaranty for payment of 
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its subsidiary's invoices. Owosso complied and, in a letter 
to Garden State dated September 8, 1997, stated: 
 
       "We, Mitchell Corporation of Owosso, the parent 
       company of Mitchell Manufacturing Group, Inc., do 
       promise to pay in full all monies owed to you for goods 
       received in the event Mitchell Manufacturing Group, 
       Inc. do not pay. 
 
       This letter is renewable in one year if needed." 
 
Soon thereafter, Owosso began discussing with the Lamont 
Group the possibility of its purchasing Mitchell 
Manufacturing. 
 
On March 3, 1998, Helen Malik, Secretary and Treasurer 
of both Owosso and Mitchell Manufacturing, wrote to 
Garden State that Owosso was "in the process of closing on 
the sale of Mitchell Manufacturing Group, Inc. to a minority 
group. . . . We are requesting that we be removed from COD 
payment requirements as of February 27, 1998." The letter 
then recited the precise language of the September 8, 1997 
guaranty. 
 
Garden State responded in a letter dated March 6, 1998, 
that "with the continuing guarantee of [Mitchell 
Manufacturing parent] Owosso," the COD payment 
arrangements would be removed. The letter continued, 
 
       "There are several things on which we'll need to agree 
       as we put the change in place. When the sale of 
       [Mitchell Manufacturing] occurs I'll need to update our 
       credit files and will be sending you the necessary 
       paperwork. We'll need to know whether the guarantee 
       of [Owosso] will be affected by the sale and, if so, to 
       what extent? If the guarantee stays fully in place we 
       will not, at this time, set formalized credit limits for 
       [Mitchell Manufacturing]. However, since [Mitchell 
       Manufacturing] is already on `net prox 30' terms, we 
       reserve the right to set such limits should [Mitchell 
       Manufacturing's] account status fall more than thirty 
       (30) days past due and contact [Owosso] directly for 
       payment. We will get in touch with you personally, or 
       anyone else whom you designate, before either of these 
       takes place. 
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       Please let me know if this is acceptable." 
 
Although that letter was addressed to Ms. Malik, William F. 
Mitchell, the president of Owosso, wrote "OK W.F. Mitchell" 
at the bottom of the document. A copy of the letter with 
this notation was then faxed to Garden State. 
 
On April 22, 1998, Owosso sold substantially all of 
Mitchell Manufacturing's assets, along with the Mitchell 
Manufacturing name, to the Lamont Group. Lamont then 
changed its name to "Mitchell Manufacturing Group, a 
Lamont Group Company." The Owosso subsidiary was 
renamed "Mitchell Automotive, Inc." 
 
Garden State asserted that it was not advised of the 
exact date of the sale and so continued to ship goods to the 
same company -- "Mitchell Manufacturing"-- at the same 
address as it had previously. By April 22, 1998, Mitchell 
Manufacturing had incurred more than $2,780,000 in 
unpaid invoices for Garden State leather. After Owosso sold 
its subsidiary, Garden State sent an additional $1,370,000 
in goods, all on credit, to Mitchell-Lamont. 
 
The record does not indicate when Garden State learned 
of the Mitchell Manufacturing sale. On June 3, 1998, 
however, its credit manager wrote Ms. Malik requesting a 
corrected version of the guaranty. Specifically, he stated: 
 
       "it would be helpful if you adjusted the [Owosso] 
       guarantee to reflect the presence of the Lamont Group 
       and the change in the relationship between Mitchell 
       Manufacturing Group, Inc. and [Owosso] (no longer the 
       "parent company"?)." 
 
The following day, Ms. Malik responded that Mitchell 
Manufacturing had been sold to the Lamont Group on April 
22, 1998 and that Owosso was no longer the parent 
company. She also represented that Lamont had assumed 
the "liability of the payables of Mitchell Manufacturing 
Group, Inc." when it purchased the company. 
 
Owosso denied liability for any of the Mitchell debt, and 
the dispute proceeded to litigation. Based on the"OK W. F. 
Mitchell" notation on Garden State's March 6, 1998 letter, 
along with other factors, including the text of the parties' 
correspondence and deposition testimony, the District 
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Court found the existence and extent of the guaranty 
agreement ambiguous. Accordingly, the matter was 
submitted to a jury presided over by a Magistrate Judge 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636. 
 
The jury returned a special verdict finding Owosso liable 
for $2,783,391.10, the total cost of goods Garden State had 
shipped to Mitchell Manufacturing before April 22, 1998. 
The jurors also held Owosso responsible for $1,365,619.82 
for the leather supplied to Mitchell-Lamont. The Magistrate 
Judge then added prejudgment interest, bringing the total 
judgment against Owosso to $4,636,515.59.1  
 
Owosso's appeal raises a number of objections, none of 
which amounts to reversible error. 
 
Owosso contends that the Court erroneously failed to 
require the jury to consider the doctrine of strictissimi juris 
in interpreting the guaranty contract. We conclude that the 
principle has no application here. 
 
The difference between the interpretation and 
construction of contracts is discussed in Ram Construction 
Co., Inc. v. American States Insurance Co., 749 F.2d 1049 
(3d Cir. 1984). When an ambiguity exists in the agreement, 
the problem is one of interpretation. If, however, the terms 
are clear, construction of the contract determines its legal 
operation. 749 F.2d at 1052-53. 
 
The paramount goal of contract interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the parties. Meeting House Lane, 
Ltd. v. Melso, 628 A.2d 854, 857 (Pa. Super. 1993) 
(guaranty contracts subject to same rules of interpretation 
as other agreements). There is no special standard of 
interpretation for contracts creating secondary obligations. 
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty S14 cmt. c 
(1996). Therefore, to the extent that there was uncertainty 
about the terms of the guaranty agreement, the issue was 
properly submitted to the jury. 
 
Owosso's argument supporting the application of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Judgments have also been entered against Mitchell Automotive, Inc. 
and Mitchell-Lamont. Owosso is presently in bankruptcy and has 
obtained leave to pursue this appeal. 
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strictissimi juris relies on a passage from the case of Pure 
Oil Co. v. Shlifer, 175 A. 895 (Pa. Super. 1934). In that 
action on a suretyship contract, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court quoted the trial court: 
 
       "It is well settled that, after the intention of the parties 
       or the scope of the guarantor's undertaking has been 
       determined by the ordinary rules of construction 
       [interpretation] either from the instrument itself or 
       from the instrument and the surrounding 
       circumstances, the rule of strictissimi juris  applies, that 
       is, that the guarantor is entitled to have his 
       undertaking as thus determined strictly construed, and 
       that it cannot be extended by construction or 
       implication beyond the precise terms of his contract 
       . . . ." 
 
175 A. 895, 898. 
 
Although this rule of construction in suretyship is 
accurate with regard to gratuitous guaranties assumed by 
individuals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held 
that the principle of strictissimi juris does not apply to 
"corporate compensated sureties." Fiumara v. Am. Sur. Co. 
of New York, 31 A.2d 283, 287 (Pa. 1943); City of 
Philadelphia v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 173 A. 181, 182 (Pa. 1934) 
("[T]he rule of strict construction applied to individuals as 
sureties does not apply to paid sureties."). Cf. Meyer v. 
Indus. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 239 A.2d 371, 373 (Pa. 
1968) (material alteration in surety agreement made 
without consent of gratuitous surety operates as complete 
discharge of surety's obligation). 
 
The rationale underlying this distinction is easily 
understood: corporate suretyship, "an undertaking for 
money consideration by a company chartered for the 
conduct of such business, . . . is essentially an insurance 
against risk." Brown v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 81 A. 410, 
410-11 (Pa. 1911). These guarantors "may call themselves 
`surety companies,' [but] their business is in all essential 
particulars that of insurance. Their contracts are usually in 
the terms prescribed by themselves, and should be 
construed most strictly in favor of the obligee." Id. at 411; 
see also Fiumara, 31 A.2d at 288 (in Pennsylvania, 
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corporate compensated surety is considered practical 
equivalent of insurance company). 
 
The distinction drawn between compensated and 
gratuitous suretyship is significant, particularly because 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet had occasion 
to rule on the application of strictissimi juris  to a guaranty 
similar to that now before us. 
 
Moreover, the Superior Court appears increasingly 
reluctant to apply that principle to guaranty agreements 
entered into for profit. Compare, e.g. , Robert Mallery Lumber 
Corp. v. B. & F. Assocs., Inc., 440 A.2d 579, 582 (Pa. Super. 
1982) (language of guaranty contract was not ambiguous, 
but if it were, it would be strictly construed against the 
guarantor-bank), with Continental Bank v. Axler , 510 A.2d 
726, 729 (Pa. Super. 1986) ("A compensated  surety is 
discharged only if, without the surety's consent, there has 
been a material modification in the creditor-debtor 
relationship and said modification has substantially 
increased the surety's risk.") (emphasis added), and Meeting 
House Lane, 628 A.2d at 857. 
 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court is not alone in its 
reluctance to apply the strictissimi juris principle. The 
United States Supreme Court stated nearly a century ago 
that the doctrine is "a stringent one, and . . . . one which 
ought not to be extended to contracts not within the reason 
of the rule, particularly when the bond is underwritten by 
a corporation which has undertaken for a profit to insure 
the obligee." United States ex rel. Hill v. Am. Sur. Co. of New 
York, 200 U.S. 197, 202 (1906). 
 
The Restatement articulates the modern antipathy 
toward the doctrine: "Older cases applied very strict rules 
. . . . As time passed, courts became unsatisfied with a rigid 
application of this doctrine" and began to retreat from it, 
particularly in cases involving more sophisticated corporate 
guarantors. Restatement (Third) Suretyship & Guaranty 
S 37 cmt. a. 
 
The courts' disillusionment with strictissimi juris is not 
difficult to understand. The doctrine protected secondary 
obligors who entered into guaranty agreements for reasons 
involving familial or neighborly affection and who did not 
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profit financially from the transaction. But the rule was 
problematic when applied to those secondary obligors who 
were in the business of underwriting debt for monetary 
benefit. 
 
Rigid application of the doctrine allowed secondary 
obligors to avoid substantial secondary obligations solely on 
the basis of minor, immaterial changes in the relationship 
between the principal obligor and obligee. The 
consequential windfalls inuring to those secondary obligors 
often exceeded any harm caused by the obligee's acts. Id. 
 
Owosso asserts that it was a gratuitous guarantor and, 
therefore, the jury was required to strictly construe the 
agreement. Nothing in the circumstances, however, 
suggests that the guaranty here was motivated by selfless 
generosity. On the contrary, the record indicates that 
Owosso was negotiating for the sale of Mitchell 
Manufacturing as early as autumn of 1997. Certainly, it 
was in Owosso's best financial interest to maintain or 
increase the subsidiary's value by keeping it in operating 
condition. It can hardly be said that the guaranty, without 
which Mitchell Manufacturing would have lost its raw 
material supply, was wholly munificent in nature. 
 
We are confident that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would reject Owosso's claim to gratuitous guarantor status 
and would instead follow the modern trend away from the 
doctrine of strictissimi juris. See,  e.g., Northern Ins. Co. v. 
Aardvark Assocs., 942 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("Although we are not bound in a diversity case to follow 
decisions of a state intermediate appellate court, we are 
instructed that such decisions are not to be disregarded by 
a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive 
data that the highest court of the state would decide 
otherwise.") (internal quotations omitted). 
 
Even if this guaranty were held to be gratuitous, 
Owosso's claim to strict construction would fail. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that it will not 
discharge gratuitous guarantors on the basis of 
modifications in the creditor-debtor relationship where the 
guarantor's consent to these changes has been obtained. 
See Meyer, 239 A.2d at 373. Here there is no question of 
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consent to changes in the agreement, because the 
guarantor itself was the driving force in bringing about the 
revision. It was Owosso that sold the assets of Garden 
State's debtor; the former parent company cannot now 
claim surprise or ignorance of the resulting effect on its 
interests. 
 
Owosso has misinterpreted the rule of strictissimi juris to 
apply to interpretation as well as to construction of the 
agreement. As noted above, we predict that Pennsylvania 
would not apply that doctrine in this case and in any event 
the question for the jury was one of interpretation. 
Owosso's contention that the guaranty applied only to 
invoices pending at the time it was issued is unconvincing. 
The jury had ample reason to interpret the letters of 
September 8, 1997 and March 3, 1998 as effective 
continuing guarantees of Mitchell Manufacturing's 
obligations to Garden State. Particularly in light of the 
September 8, 1997 letter, which stated that the guaranty 
would be renewable in one year if needed, it is doubtful 
that the jury could have concluded otherwise. 
 
The findings on the Mitchell-Lamont invoices rest on 
somewhat different grounds. Essentially, the claim for debts 
accrued after the sale to the Lamont Group is based on the 
"OK" of Owosso's President Mitchell, affixed to Garden 
State's letter of March 6, 1998. The jury was entitled to 
consider this notation as evidence that Owosso would 
adhere to its guaranty after the sale, at least until it 
notified Garden State otherwise. 
 
At first glance, it would appear unusual for Owosso to 
maintain the guaranty after the sale to Lamont. Garden 
State, however, did not know the details of the transfer, 
and the company to which it continued to ship its goods 
after the sale bore the same name and mailing address. 
Garden State could reasonably have surmised that Owosso 
sold less than all of Mitchell Manufacturing's assets, or 
perhaps exchanged stock, or that under the terms of the 
arrangement, it was important to Owosso that Lamont 
continue to receive leather supplies. The jury might also 
have considered it highly significant that Owosso never 
communicated its intent to revoke the guaranty until 
contacted by Garden State in June 1998. 
 
                                9 
  
In addition, we note that the jurors might well have been 
impressed with the fact that Garden State, relying on 
Owosso's guaranty, shipped substantial amounts of leather 
to Mitchell-Lamont, a course of action it likely would not 
have followed in the absence of the guaranty. 
 
Owosso also complains that the District Court erred in 
refusing to admit evidence that Garden State ignored pre- 
set credit limits although the unpaid invoices of Mitchell 
Manufacturing and Mitchell-Lamont were rapidly 
burgeoning. Although Garden State had set an internal 
credit limit of $1 million on Mitchell Manufacturing, this 
information was never conveyed to Owosso. Accordingly, 
there was no basis on which the guarantor could invoke 
that limit. The ruling excluding that evidence is not 
reversible. 
 
Owosso also argues that the imposition of prejudgment 
interest was in error. We find no merit to that issue, nor to 
Owosso's remaining contentions, which, we find, do not 
warrant discussion. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
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